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While various liability rules of tort law provide eﬃcient incentives
to invest, breach remedies of contract law are claimed to be distortive.
Since, at least in Germany, obligations law provides general rules for
both contractual and tort relationships such discrepancy seems puz-
zling. The paper identiﬁes a saddle point property as the driving force
behind most eﬃciency results and it establishes that fault rules of a
general type generate this property. The model is then confronted
with important legal rules of the German law of obligations. The al-
leged ineﬃciency of expectation damages turns out to rest, not on a
failure of breach remedies, but on the binary nature of delivery choice
as imposed by the traditional analysis of contract law.
JEL classiﬁcation: K13, K12, D62
∗The author wants to thank Thomas Ackermann and Gerhard Wagner for stimulating
discussions on the legal aspects of the paper and Patrick Schmitz for equally helpful
comments from the economic perspective. Useful comments from two referees are also
gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are of course mine.
11 Introduction
Contract, unjust enrichment and tort are the main subjects of the law of
obligations. The economic analysis of tort law examines eﬃciency properties
of liability rules. In the setting of the bilateral care level accident model, all
liability rules except strict liability and no liability are known to be eﬃcient.1
Moreover, in sequential tort cases, the eﬃcient solution may even emerge from
backwards induction.
The economic analysis of contract law investigates various remedies for
breach of contract. It is a common tenet that, in contrast to tort law, damage
measures such as expectation or reliance damages typically fail to provide
eﬃcient incentives.2 This discrepancy seems particularly puzzling because,
in some countries at least, contract and tort law are subject of a general
obligations law.
The German legal system, for example, codiﬁes contract law as well as
tort law in the second book of BGB3 under the common headline of law
of obligations. No doubt, similar legal constructions can be found in other
countries as well.4 For that reason, while the German law of obligations
serves as guideline for the present paper, the ﬁndings might be of interest
for other legal systems as well. In any case, the common feature is that
the law provides standards of conduct which, if kept, exempt parties from
having to compensate harmful eﬀects. Such rules are referred to as fault
rules.5 In tort law, an injurer must be found negligent for the victim to be
granted compensation for his losses from an accident (§ 823 BGB). The rules
of contract law in general are rather intricate. In principle, the promisee is
entitled to speciﬁc performance. But there are many deviations from this
basic rule. The present paper considers cases of impossibility for which the
standard of conduct is as follows. If it is impossible for the promisor to
perform then the promisee is denied speciﬁc performance. Moreover, only
if the promisor is responsible for such impossibility the promisee can claim
1For a proof, see textbooks such as Landes and Posner [1987] or Cooter and Ulen [2000].
Jain and Singh [2002] fully characterize eﬃcient liability rules.
2See Shavell [1980a] and the textbooks.
3BGB: Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code), version of 2 January 2002.
4In Switzerland, e.g., the corresponding law is even called ”Obligationenrecht”.
5See Cooter (1985).
2damages (§§ 280, 283 BGB). Hence, the standard of conduct, in this case, is
given by considerations of responsibility.
While the economic analysis of tort law has extensively explored stan-
dards of conduct in the above sense,6 corresponding studies of contract typ-
ically do not take such standards into account. The present paper provides
a unifying approach to the economic analysis of obligations and it explores
the use of standards of conduct in general.
The care level accident model has both the victim and the injurer facing
a one-dimensional and continuous choice of care levels. The normative goal
consists of minimizing the sum of expected losses and costs of precautionary
measures. Expected losses are assumed to be diﬀerentiable and convex func-
tions of care levels. While this model provides many interesting insights, it
does not readily ﬁt real cases. Levels of care are not easily separated from
other activity levels. In addition, more often than not, parties’ decisions are
better captured by discrete than continuous choice.
Therefore, the present paper introduces a more general obligations model.
Parties are allowed to face a possibly multi-dimensional decision problem
without restriction on whether choice is discrete or continuous and external
eﬀects are allowed to go in both directions. The only assumption imposed
concerns the existence of a decision proﬁle which maximizes social surplus.
The traditional care level accident model as well as Cooter’s (1985) model
of precaution can be viewed as a special case of the more general obligations
model. The extended model captures cases of tort and contract law and it
allows to address unjust enrichment as well.
The traditional accident model is expressed in expected terms. The
present paper, instead, models the stochastic environment explicitly. Harm-
ful eﬀects are assumed to arise from the interaction between parties’ decisions
and a move of nature. Nature is not behaving strategically but just follows
some exogenously given stochastic rule, i.e. nature’s decision is modelled as
a random move. Modelling the stochastic environment explicitly allows to
examine rules with a defense of violating the standard not being the cause-
in-fact of the loss event and to discover interpretations of liability rules that
diﬀer from earlier treatments.
6For textbooks providing a rigorous analysis of tort law, the reader is referred to Shavell
(1987) and Miceli (1997).
3>From the perspective of economic analysis, the main contribution of the
paper consists of identifying a certain saddle point property as the driving
force behind most eﬃciency results. This property, while easy to check, has
far-reaching consequences in terms of eﬃciency. The eﬃcient solution is, not
only, a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the legal rule but, under
sequential choice, even emerges as subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. If
parties renegotiate this does not distort the ﬁrst moving party’s incentives
and, well in line with the Coase theorem, restores eﬃciency oﬀ the equilibrium
path as well. Moreover, since the Nash equilibrium generates the minmax
payoﬀs for both players, games induced by legal rules, while not being zero
sum, still share some of the nice properties of zero sum games.
Rules combining standards of conduct with granting damages to the op-
ponent of the deviating party and possibly requiring to compensate unjust
enrichment are generally referred to as fault rules by the present paper. Such
fault rules are then shown to induce the above saddle point property. As a
consequence, under fault rules, all the desirable properties of eﬃciency will
hold.
The saddle point result also lends itself to interpretations of legal rules
that would be consistent with economic eﬃciency. The following example will
serve as an illustration of the approach. As mentioned before, a pure regime
of expectation damages may lead to overreliance on part of the promisee.7
Yet, German contract law combines expectation damages with a standard of
conduct. Such a fault rule turns out to hold the potential for lowering the
promisor’s incentives to invest eﬃciently. However, if the seller is excused
from speciﬁc performance, § 326 BGB grants relief from consideration to the
promisee. In addition, if the promisor has partially fulﬁlled and only the
remaining performance has become impossible then the promisee might be
entitled to abate the price. It is not easy to interpret the abatement rule (§
441 BGB) in the framework of an exactly speciﬁed model. For that reason,
measures of abatement are approached from the opposite end by asking which
conditions on the abatement rule would maintain the saddle point property.
The present paper provides the answer to this question.
The paper also revisits traditional liability rules for the accident model
which typically are expressed in terms of expected losses. While the present
7See, e.g., Shavell (1980a).
4paper questions the interpretation behind these rules it still shows that they
all generate the saddle point property needed to ensure all the nice properties
of eﬃciency. In this sense, the ﬁndings of traditional tort law analysis can
easily be recovered as a corollary of the present paper’s general eﬃciency
result.
Finally, the paper also revisits the alleged ineﬃciency induced by damage
measures. The main ﬁnding is that such ineﬃciency may just be due to
the assumed dichotomous performance choice. If the decision concerns some
more continuous quantity or quality choice, expectation damages may well
provide eﬃcient incentives to invest, even if the contract is conﬁned to specify,
independent of nature’s move, a constant delivery choice only. Edlin and
Reichelstein [1996] have established similar results before.
The present paper explores the ﬁrst best theory of obligations. Econo-
mists reading the paper will search in vain for fancy games of asymmetric
information. Legal scholars, on the other side, will question the practical
relevance of an approach which relies on courts being so well informed. Nev-
ertheless, I strongly believe ﬁrst best analysis to be an indispensable ﬁrst step
in understanding legal institutions. While actual law cannot be expected to
design mechanisms that live up to the rigorous standard of modern economics
of information, ﬁrst best theory seems to be a more modest but reasonable
vehicle to examine the economic logic behind the law.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the obligations
model and it establishes the consequences of the saddle point property in
terms of eﬃciency. Section 3 introduces the general class of fault rules. Fault
rules are then shown to induce the saddle point property. Rules of last clear
chances under sequential tort turn out to aﬀect the solution, if at all, only oﬀ
the equilibrium path. Section 4 lists the conditions of abatement rules that
are consistent with the saddle point property. Section 5 explores the saddle
point property of traditional liability rules. Section 6 relates ineﬃciencies of
breach remedies to the ﬁndings of the present paper. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model of obligations
Extensive use of the following obligations model will be made throughout the
paper. Two risk-neutral parties A and B are facing decisions r ∈ R and s ∈ S,
5respectively. The parties may be injurer and victim in a tort case or promisor
and promisee in a contractual relationship. The sets R and S of admissible
choices, i.e. the strategy spaces are allowed to be multi-dimensional and to
combine discrete and continuous choice. In the absence of any liability rule
or contract, the expected net payoﬀs of the two parties depend on the parties’
decisions and are denoted by a(r,s) and b(r,s). These payoﬀ functions are
referred to as pre-law payoﬀ functions.T h e s u m w(r,s)=a(r,s)+b(r,s)
of payoﬀs is referred to as social surplus because, by assumption, no further
parties are aﬀected by the decisions of parties A and B.
While, in a contractual relationship, all kind of payoﬀs can be protected
by law, this is not the case in a tort relationship. Yet, since this distinction
will not be the subject of the present paper, for all applications of tort law, I
shall assume that the payoﬀ functions express the monetary values of given
property rights. Such values are protected by § 823 BGB.
The eﬃcient solution (r∗,s ∗) ∈ R × S maximizes social surplus, i.e.
(r∗,s ∗) ∈ argmaxr∈R,s∈S w(r,s). Put diﬀerently, for any pair of decisions




Legal rules aﬀect payoﬀs. Let φ(r,s) and ψ(r,s) denote party A and
B’s post-law payoﬀ functions. The rules under consideration allow neither
for ﬁnes to nor subsidies from an outside party such that post-law payoﬀ
functions still add up to social surplus, i.e. φ/r,s)+ψ(r,s)=w(r,s). Al e g a l
rule is called eﬃcient if the eﬃcient solution forms a Nash equilibrium of the








hold for all r and s.
Under sequential choice,p a r t yAi sa s s u m e dt om o v eﬁr s ts u c ht h a tp a r t y
B can observe A’s choice before B must decide. The game is solved by

















In this case, along the equilibrium path, the outcome will be eﬃcient. Oﬀ






i.e. sB(r) 6= s+(r) m a yp o s s i b l yo c c u rf o rr 6= r∗. The corresponding renego-




In such situations, well in line with the Coase-Theorem, parties may be
expected to renegotiate to the socially best response. If they do, their post-
renegotiation payoﬀ functions φ
reneg(r) and ψ
reneg(r) a d du pt ow(r,s+(r)).
Moreover, since both parties could refuse to renegotiate, post-renegotiation












Under sequential choice, it would be highly desirable that legal rules are
not just eﬃcient but that even the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
is eﬃcient and that renegotiations oﬀ the equilibrium path do not distort









if it holds for all r and s, turns out to be suﬃcient for all these desirable
properties to hold as the following proposition establishes. The condition
requires that each party, when deciding eﬃciently, is never hurt by the other
party’s deviation from its eﬃcient decision. For reasons which become clear
along the proof of the proposition, condition (5) is referred to as the saddle
point property.
7Proposition 1 If the saddle point property (5) holds, then the following
claims are valid:
1.T h ee ﬃcient solution (r∗,s ∗) is a Nash equilibrium.
2. All Nash equilibria are payoﬀ equivalent, i.e. if (rN,s N) is another
Nash equilibrium, then φ(rN,s N)=φ(r∗,s ∗) and ψ(rN,s N)=ψ(r∗,s ∗)
must hold.










4. Under sequential choice, the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is
eﬃcient.
5. If, oﬀ the equilibrium path, ineﬃcient decisions are renegotiated, the
equilibrium outcome remains to be eﬃcient.
Proof. The proof is remarkably simple. Since φ(r,s∗)=w(r,s∗) − ψ(r,s∗)









and, by a similar argument, that ψ(r∗,s) ≤ ψ(r∗,s ∗) must hold. Hence, claim
1i se s t a b l i s h e d .
If (rN,s N) is another Nash equilibrium, then, since rN is A’s best response


























Since the eﬃcient solution maximizes social surplus, all the above inequalities
must be binding. This establishes claim 2.
8Condition (5) implies (2) and, hence, the eﬃcient solution is a saddle
point of both parties’ post-law payoﬀ functions. Claim 3 is known to follow
from this fact (see, e.g. Karlin [1959, pp. 21 - 23]).







holds for all r, in particular for A’s optimal choice rA. Moreover, again by
































as was to be shown to establish claim 4.
By making use of the renegotiation constraint (4), claim 5 can be estab-
lished by extending the argument for claim 4.
In spite of the fact that the games under consideration fail to be constant
sum, the above proposition shows that most properties of zero sum games
still hold under the saddle point property, with the following noteworthy
exception. If a constant sum game has two Nash equilibria then combining
the strategy of party A under the ﬁrst equilibrium with B’s strategy from the
second equilibrium leads to yet a third Nash equilibrium. The saddle point
property is not suﬃcient to extend this result to games that are not constant
sum.
In the remaining part of the paper, many rules of obligations law are
shown to induce post-law payoﬀ functions which fulﬁl lt h es a d d l ep o i n tp r o p -
erty. It then follows from the above proposition that these rules have all the
properties which are desirable from the economic point of view. In this sense,
the proposition identiﬁes the saddle point property as the driving force be-
hind many of the eﬃciency results of the economic analysis of obligations
law.
93 Fault rules
The law of obligations provides standards of conduct which, if kept, exempt
parties from having to compensate harmful eﬀects (see introduction). By the
same token, if a party deviates from such a standard of conduct it must com-
pensate the other party’s losses arising from the deviation. Occasionally, a
party’s deviation may also cause a gain for the other party. Under additional
conditions (see §§ 812, 818 BGB), the party beneﬁtting from the deviation
may have to compensate unjust enrichment. Rules of this type are referred
to as fault rules. The main result of this section establishes that fault rules
generate post-law payoﬀ functions which satisfy the saddle point property.
The pre-law payoﬀ functions of the obligations model, so far, have been
expressed in expected terms. To capture details of fault rules, it proves crucial
to model the stochastic environment explicitly. Therefore, a random move of
nature ω ∈ Ω is introduced which occurs after the parties have chosen their
decisions r and s.L e tA(r,s,ω) and B(r,s,ω) express their pre-law payoﬀsa s
functions of decisions and the random move of nature. Their pre-law payoﬀ
functions in expected terms can simply be recovered by making use of the
expectation operator E,i . e .
a(r,s)=E [A(r,s,ω)] and b(r,s)=E [B(r,s,ω)].
Fault rules rely on standards of conduct which, as usual in the economic
analysis of law, are identiﬁed with the eﬃcient decisions. If party B deviates
by deciding s 6= s∗,i tm a yd e p e n do nt h er a n d o mm o v eo fn a t u r ew h e t h e r
party A suﬀers or beneﬁts from such a deviation. In the ﬁrst case, A may
claim damages amounting to A(r,s∗,ω)−A(r,s,ω) > 0 where r denotes A’s
actual decision. In the second case, A may possibly have to pay A(r,s,ω) −
A(r,s∗,ω) > 0 as compensation for its unjust enrichment. More generally,
legal rules may lead to intermediate cases where party A can claim damages
DA(r,s,ω) for which it holds that
A(r,s
∗,ω) − A(r,s,ω) ≤ DA(r,s,ω) ≤ max[A(r,s
∗,ω) − A(r,s,ω),0]. (6)
Notice the convention that, if DA < 0 this means that A must pay −DA to
B. For reasons of symmetry, party B may claim damages DB(r,s,ω) which,
depending on the details of the legal rule, are in the range
B(r
∗,s,ω)−B(r,s,ω) ≤ DB(r,s,ω) ≤ max[B(r
∗,s,ω) − B(r,s,ω),0]. (7)
10I refer to damage rules satisfying (6) and (7) generally as fault rules.F a u l t
rules induce post-law payoﬀ functions
φ(r,s)=a(r,s)+E [DA(r,s,ω)] − E [DB(r,s,ω)]
and
ψ(r,s)=b(r,s)+E [DB(r,s,ω)] − E [DA(r,s,ω)]
for party A and B, respectively.
Notice if party B’s pre-law payoﬀ function B = B(s,ω) does not depend
on party A’s decision r,t h e nDB ≡ 0. Similarly, a party can never claim




Proposition 2 Under fault rules in the above sense, the post law payoﬀ
functions satisfy the saddle point property.














which is the saddle point property for A’s payoﬀ function. For reasons of
symmetry, the saddle point property also holds for the other party.
Under fault rules, the saddle point property holds and, hence, proposition
1 applies. In this sense, no further legal rule would be needed to ensure that
the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is eﬃcient. Nevertheless, there
exist further rules for cases of sequential tort. In fact, imagine that party B
is the victim of an obligation. Since B is assumed to move last, the rule of
last clear chance might apply (see § 254 II BGB). This rule, while not needed
to ensure eﬃciency along the equilibrium path, may still improve eﬃciency
oﬀ the equilibrium path as the following proposition establishes.
If A has deviated from its standard of conduct, i.e. if it has decided r 6= r∗,
it is B’s duty to limit (social) losses by choosing the socially best response
s+(r) (see (3)). If A had kept its standard of conduct, B’s maximum payoﬀ
would amount to B(r∗,s ∗,ω). Therefore, under a rule of last clear chance, B


















only for B not making use of its last chance in a socially best way, i.e. for

















Proposition 3 Under a rule of last clear chance in the above sense, the
second moving party has the incentive to choose, on and oﬀ the equilibrium
path, the socially best response. Anticipating this response, the ﬁrst moving
party still has eﬃcient incentives to invest.
Proof. Since DL
































which establishes the ﬁrst part of the proposition.























Therefore, since s∗ is B’s best response to r∗, it follows that the eﬃcient
decision r∗ maximizes A’s expected payoﬀ indeed.
Notice, while the eﬃcient solution still emerges as a subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome, the saddle point property may be lost under the above
rule of last clear chance.
4 Impossibility and abatement
In this section, a subclass of the general obligations model is considered
which allows to capture obligations where, due to insuﬃcient investments
12a n d / o rt h em o v eo fn a t u r e ,i tm a yb e c o m ei m p o s s i b l ef o rt h ep r o m i s o rt o
perform. If, say, party B as the promisor fails to perform then party A as the
promisee is entitled to expectation damages but only if B is ruled responsible
for the impossibility to perform. In this sense, § 283 BGB deﬁnes a standard
of conduct which holds for obligations in general, not just for contractual
obligations.
To capture impossibility, the present section introduces the event tech-
nology which has the impossibility to perform arising from the interaction
between parties’ decisions and a random move of nature ω ∈ Ω.I n o r d e r
to simplify, I assume that the promisee’s decision, while aﬀecting the size of
the loss from non-performance, does not foster the incidence of the loss event
itself. Taking this simpliﬁcation into account, the event technology is deﬁned
as a map
e : S × Ω → {0,1}
where e(s,ω)=1 means that performance becomes impossible if the injurer
has decided s and the true state of nature is ω and e(s,ω)=0 ,o t h e r w i s e .I n
case of a loss event, the victim suﬀers a loss amounting to ∆(r,ω) ≥ 0.T h i s
loss possibly depends on the victim’s decision and the true state of nature.8
The pre-law payoﬀ functions are assumed to be of the following structure:
A = A(r,s,ω)=H(r,ω) − e(s,ω)∆(r,ω) − T
and
B = B(s,ω)=K(s,ω)+T
where, in case of a contractual obligation, T denotes the price which party A
has agreed to pay to B. For illustration, imagine a buyer-seller relationship.
Then H(r,ω) would be A’s net beneﬁt from reliances under performance
and −K(s,ω) would be B’s costs of precautionary investments and of perfor-
mance if performance remains possible. Since A’s decision does not enter B’s
pre-law payoﬀ function, B can never claim damages from A. For simplicity,
compensation of unjust enrichment is also ruled out. Hence A may claim
damages amounting exactly to
DA(r,s,ω)=m a x [ A(r,s
∗,ω) − A(r,s,ω),0] = (8)
max[e(s,ω) − e(s
∗,ω),0]∆(r,ω).
8For more general cases, the reader is referred to the next section.
13Notice, such damages are positive only if the loss event has occurred for the
single reason that A has deviated from the standard of conduct, i.e. only if
e(s,ω)=1 >e (s
∗,ω)=0 .
If B has deviated from the standard of conduct but the loss event would
neither have been avoided by sticking to it, i.e.
e(s,ω)=1 = e(s
∗,ω), (9)
then the promisor’s deviation was not cause-in-fact of the loss event and, due
to § 283 BGB, A could not claim damages, well in line with (8). The above




It immediately follows from proposition 2 that the payoﬀ functions expressed
in expected terms φ(r,s)=E[Φ(r,s,ω)] and ψ(r,s)=E[Ψ(r,s,ω)] satisfy
the saddle point property, ensuring all the eﬃciency consequences of propo-
sition 1. In this sense, § 283 BGB, while making use of expectation damages,
prevents the promisee from overreliance because, at the same time, it relies
o nas t a n d a r do fc o n d u c t . 9
So far, I have assumed that the promisee has to pay the price if the
promisor is not responsible for the impossibility to perform, i.e. in case (9).
Such a rule would correspond to periculum est emptoris which, however, does
not apply under current German law. In fact, it is § 326 BGB which rules
that if, due to impossibility, the promisee is denied speciﬁc performance then
the promisor is also not entitled to the price T which was speciﬁed in the
original contract. Moreover, if the promisor has partially fulﬁlled then § 441
BGB might apply which allows the promisee to abate the price. The meaning
of the abatement rule remains ambiguous if confronted with an exact model.
9Cooter (1985) argues that the common law tradition also has a solution to the problem
of overreliance which is diﬀerent form a fault rule, namely liquidated damages which do
not depend on the promisee’s reliances. Moreover, when damages are not liquidated in
the contract, various legal doctrines are available that achieve the same as liquidation of
damages.
14In the following, instead, it is investigated what conditions of an abatement
rule would preserve the saddle point property which just has been shown to
hold under periculum est emptoris.
Let M(r,s,ω) denote the abatement of the price such that the post-law








The following three conditions will prove suﬃcient to preserve the saddle
point property:















The ﬁrst two properties correspond to a restricted form of a saddle point
property. If the promisee has invested eﬃciently the promisor cannot di-
minish the abatement of the price, not even by overinvestment. Similarly,
if the promisor keeps the standard of conduct the promisee cannot raise the
abatement of the price, not even by overreliance. The last property, ﬁnally,
requires that, at eﬃcient decisions, the abatement of the price is bounded
from above by the actual loss due to impossibility.
Proposition 4 If the rule of abatement satisﬁes conditions (10) - (12) then
the post-law payoﬀ functions E[Φa(r,s,ω)] and E[Ψa(r,s,ω)] still exhibit the
saddle point property.

















15must hold for all s and ω. By distinguishing four cases according to whether







holds for all ω and hence, independent of the stochastic rule behind nature’s











as follows from (11), the saddle point property also holds for B’s payoﬀ
function. The proposition is established.
5 Liability rules revisited
This section revisits the traditional accident model which has extensively
been explored in the economic analysis of tort law and which corresponds
to a subclass of the model studied in the previous section. Both parties are
assumed to choose a continuous care level r,s ∈ R = S =[ 0 ,∞) which cap-
tures precautionary measures in monetary terms. Raising care levels lowers
expected losses. It is assumed that productive decisions and precautionary
measures are fully separable from each other. The care level model expresses
the precautionary part of the problem while the productive part remains
unconsidered. This is the reason why the model does not readily ﬁtr e a l
cases.10
Expressed as a subcase of the general obligations model, the injurer’s and
the victim’s expected pre-law payoﬀsa m o u n tt o
a = a(r)=−r and b(r,s)=−s − d(r,s)
where d(r,s) denotes the expected loss to the victim. Higher investments by
the injurer, in particular, lead to lower expected losses, i.e. if r<r 0 then
d(r,s) ≥ d(r0,s). By making use of an event technology
e : R × S × Ω → {0,1},
10Shavell (1980b), to be sure, has considered a model including the choice of both activity
and care levels. While Shavell deals with a second best problem where the standards
cannot be conditioned on the activity levels, the present paper concentrates on the more
elementary ﬁr s tb e s ta p p r o a c h .
16again, the stochastic environment can be modelled explicitly. Notice, to allow
for richer applications, the victim’s decision may now aﬀect the occurrence
of the loss event as well. The loss in case of an accident ∆(r,s,ω) is also
allowed to depend on both decisions. The expected loss amounts to d(r,s)=
E[e(r,s,ω)∆(r,s,ω)] and the pre-law payoﬀ functions are
A = A(r)=−r and B = B(r,s,ω)=−s − e(r,s,ω)∆(r,s,ω).
Since the injurer A’s payoﬀ function does not depend on victim B’s de-
cision, A can never claim damages from B. Party B, however, may claim
damages from A. What amount exactly could B claim under actual law? If
the injurer keeps to the standard of conduct r∗ then the victim could not
claim any damages, i.e. DB(r∗,s,ω)=0 . If the injurer deviates but the
victim decides eﬃciently, i.e. if r 6= r∗ but s = s∗ then two cases must
be distinguished. Either the injurer’s deviation is causal for the accident
(e(r,s∗,ω)=1 >e (r∗,s ∗,ω)=0 ). Then the victim may recover full losses,
i.e. DB(r,s∗,ω)=∆(r,s∗,ω). Or the injurer’s deviation is not causal for the
accident (e(r,s∗,ω)=e(r∗,s ∗,ω)=1). Then the victim, according to the
diﬀerence principle, may claim damages amounting to
DB(r,s




only. This diﬀerence principle rests on § 249 BGB which generally deﬁnes
t h es i z eo fe x p e c t a t i o nd a m a g e s . 11
Proposition 5 Under the above diﬀerence principle, the post-law payoﬀ func-
tions satisfy the saddle point property.
Proof. It follows from the above deﬁnitions that
DB(r









and, hence, the diﬀerence principle leads to a fault rule in the sense of propo-
sition 2. Therefore, the claim of the present proposition immediately follows
from that proposition.
11I am grateful to Hans-Bernd Schäfer who has drawn my attention to the legal source
of the diﬀerence principle.
17Notice, the above interpretation, while in the same spirit, still diﬀers from
Kahan’s [1989] rule. In fact, Kahan takes party with the tradition to express
liability rules in terms of expected losses. His rule would lead to post-law
payoﬀ functions
φ




K(r,s)=−s − d(r,s)+m a x[ d(r,s) − d(r
∗,s),0].
Yet, as I have shown, modelling the stochastic environment explicitly leads
to an interpretation of the legal rule which, in general, cannot be expressed
in terms of expected losses only. Nevertheless, the post-law payoﬀ functions
induced by Kahan’s interpretation would also satisfy the saddle point prop-
erty. The proof can easily be adapted from that of proposition 2 and, for
that reason, is omitted.
Liability rules as investigated in traditional tort law analysis also exhibit
the saddle point property as I now want to show. Under such rules, post-law





t(r,s)=−s − [1 − λ(r,s)]d(r,s)
where 0 ≤ λ(r,s) ≤ 1 denotes the share of the expected loss which the injurer
must compensate. The following two conditions on the liability rule turn out
to be suﬃcient to ensure the saddle point property.
If the injurer keeps to the standard of conduct then the injurer is not
liable, i.e., for all s,
λ(r
∗,s)=0 (13)
whereas if the injurer underinvests but the victim invests eﬃciently then the
injurer must compensate full losses, i.e. if r<r ∗ but s = s∗ then
λ(r,s
∗)=1. (14)
Notice that the negligence rule, the negligence rule with a defense of con-
tributory negligence, strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence
and comparative negligence, all fulﬁll the two conditions and, hence, they all
induce post-law payoﬀ functions that satisfy the saddle point property as the
following proposition establishes.
18Proposition 6 Under traditional liability rules satisfying conditions (13)
and (14), post-law payoﬀ functions φ
t and ψ
t satisfy the saddle point prop-
erty.













as follows from (13). Therefore, the eﬃcient solution is a saddle point of the
injurer’s post-law payoﬀ function.


















as follows from (13) again. If r<r ∗ then ψ
t(r,s∗)−ψ
t(r∗,s ∗)=d(r∗,s ∗) ≥ 0
as follows from (14) whereas, if r∗ <r ,t h e nψ
t(r,s∗)−ψ
t(r∗,s ∗) ≥ d(r∗,s ∗)−
d(r,s∗) ≥ 0 as follows from the assumption that the expected loss is a decreas-
ing function of precautionary investments. Therefore, the eﬃcient solution
is a saddle point of the victim’s post-law payoﬀ function as well and, hence,
the proposition is established.
To deal with tort under sequential moves, Wittman (1981) has investi-
g a t e dt h er u l eo fstrict marginal cost liability.12 Without going into details,
I simply mention that his rule if applied to the obligations model would give
rise to expected post-law payoﬀ amounting to
ψ
W(r,s)=w(r,s) − w(r,s
+(r)) + m (15)
for party B where m is a constant not aﬀecting incentives. Under strict mar-
ginal cost liability, the second moving party B responds by the socially best
response and the ﬁrst moving party A has eﬃcient investments as a dominant
strategy. Therefore, the eﬃcient solution emerges as subgame perfect equi-
librium outcome under strict marginal cost liability as well. Notice, however,
that the eﬃcient solution would not be a saddle point of B’s post-law payoﬀ
function. In this sense, it diﬀers qualitatively from traditional liability rules.
Marginal cost liability has been dismissed as not being used in practice.
12See also Miceli (1997).
196 Are expectation damages ineﬃcient?
It is a common tenet of the economic analysis of contract law that expectation
damages induce overreliance (see Shavell (1980a), Rogerson (1984) and the
textbooks on law and economics). The present paper, in contrast, has shown
that fault rules, in general, have very nice eﬃciency properties. To illuminate
the issue, the present section identiﬁes the potential source of ineﬃciency.
Ineﬃciency results make use of a model with the following time struc-
ture. First, party A as the promisee decides on reliances r ∈ R.S e c -
ond, there is a random move ω ∈ Ω of nature before, third, party B as
the promisor decides on y ∈ Y . The pre-law payoﬀ functions, reﬂecting
this time structure, are denoted by A(r,ω,y) and B(ω,y), social surplus by
W(r,ω,y)=A(r,ω,y)+B(ω,y), respectively. As usual, reliances are as-
sumed not to enter the promisor’s pre-law payoﬀ function and, hence, B can
never claim damages from A but, of course, A may possibly claim damages
from B.
To be sure, the present time structure diﬀers from the one imposed in
earlier sections. But this in itself is not the source of ineﬃciency. In fact, let
r∗ and y∗(ω) denote the eﬃcient solution. Since B decides after the move of
nature, its eﬃcient decision must be state contingent. By deﬁnition, for any
r of A and any state contingent decision y(ω) it holds that
E [W(r,ω,y(ω))] ≤ E [W(r
∗,ω,y
∗(ω))].
As before, damages claimed by the promisee are governed by the fault rule
if they are within the range
A(r,ω,y
∗(ω))−A(r,ω,y) ≤ DA(r,ω,y) ≤ max[A(r,ω,y
∗(ω)) − A(r,ω,y),0].
Such damages induce post-law payoﬀ functions Φ(r,ω,y)=W(r,ω,y) −
Ψ(r,ω,y) and
Ψ(r,ω,y)=B(ω,y)+T − DA(r,ω,y)
for A and B, respectively. It then follows from proposition 2 that the eﬃcient
solution is a saddle point of both post-law payoﬀ functions. Therefore, by
proposition 1, the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome will be eﬃcient. In
this sense, contract law generates eﬃcient incentives if it has to complete
an incomplete contract specifying the appropriate state contingent decision
y∗(ω) and if expectation damages are granted in case of deviations.
20The literature on ineﬃciency of expectation damages is more demanding.
It deals with contracts that are not state-contingent. Such contracts just
specify a price T and a constant decision yc ∈ Y . Fault rules based on such
contracts grant damages Dc





c) − A(r,ω,y),0]. (16)






Shavell (1980a) and Rogerson (1984) deal with a setting of continuous
reliance decision but binary delivery choice, i.e. R =[ 0 ,∞) and Y = {0,1}.
For illustration, suppose the promisee A is a buyer with utility v(r,ω) under
performance such that A’s pre-law payoﬀ function has the form
A(r,ω,y)=v(r,ω)y − r
w h e r e a sB ,a st h es e l l e r ,h a sp a y o ﬀ function B(ω,y)=−c(ω)y where c(ω)
denotes cost of performance in state ω of nature. In this setting, a contract
specifying yc =0w o u l dl e a dt ot h es a m eo u t c o m ea si ft h ep a r t i e sh a d
signed no contract at all. Therefore the literature concentrates on the only
other constant contract available under binary choice, namely the contract
specifying performance yc = 1 for all moves of nature. For such contracts,




c) − A(r,ω,y). (17)




c = 1) ∈ argmax
r E [v(r,ω)] − r
and, hence, they are excessive. Notice, however, with no contract or, equiv-
alently, with a contract specifying yc =0 , there would exist no incentives
to invest at all. To summarize, in a setting of binary choice, obviously, two
decisions yL and yH must exist such that the promisee’s incentives to invest





This result allows for substantial generalization as the following proposition
establishes.
21Proposition 7 Suppose investment decisions are continuous, i.e. R =[ 0 ,∞),
and the promisee’s pre-law payoﬀ function is concave, i.e. Arr(r,ω,y) ≤ 0.
If the promisee can claim damages according to (17) then there must ex-
i s tc o n s t a n tc h o i c e syL and yH such that contracts specifying these constant
choices lead to underreliance and overreliance, respectively, i.e. (18) must
hold. Since the promisor’s best response is equal to the socially best response,
neither oﬀ nor on the equilibrium path, there is scope for renegotiations.






and, hence, its decision coincides with the socially best response. The last
claim of the proposition is settled.
Eﬃcient investments, under the assumptions of the proposition, can be
derived from ﬁrst order condition
E [Wr(r
∗,ω,y


















∗,ω,y L)] ≤ E [Ar(r
∗,ω,y
∗(ω))] ≤ E [Ar(r
∗,ω,y H)].
Since the promisee’s post-law payoﬀ amounts to
Φ




it follows that the promisee underinvests and overinvests if the contract has
speciﬁed the constant choice yc = yL and yc = yH, respectively. The propo-
sition is established.
If the delivery choice is continuous then, under the premises of the above
proposition, an intermediate constant value y∗ ∈ Y can be found which, if
speciﬁed in the contract, provides eﬃcient incentives to invest. Since the
promisor decides in favor of the socially best response, the subgame perfect
22equilibrium outcome must be eﬃcient. In other words, the parties have a
simple contract with a ﬁxed delivery choice at their disposal such that fault
rule (17) induces the eﬃcient outcome.
Under additional assumptions, Edlin and Reichelstein [1996] have shown
that a similar result also holds for rules granting expectation damages
D
e
A(r,ω,y)=m a x[ A(r,ω,y
c) − A(r,ω,y),0]
without compensation of enrichment. While their analysis is quite sophis-
ticated, the above proposition captures the main point in a rather simple
way. In any case, ineﬃciency of expectation damages as traditionally estab-
lished in a setting of binary choice is due to the fact that, if randomization
is excluded, intermediate choices fail to exist.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The overwhelming bulk of formal papers dealing with the law of obligations
has been developed in the United States which is a common law country.
Even scholars writing about law and economics in the civil law tradition
usually rely on these models when discussing issues of the economic analysis
of law.13 No doubt, many insights gained from models introduced in the
common law tradition are of relevance for civil law countries as well. Yet,
when confronting such models with actual law, the ﬁt is not always one-
to-one. For that reason, the present paper attempts to improve the ﬁtb y
modifying the traditional common law models appropriately. It introduces a
general model of obligations which captures cases of tort, contract and unjust
enrichment.
By the way, it may even capture cases of nuisance law which are not part
of obligations law.14 In fact, according to § 906 BGB, the harmful eﬀect will
not be compensated if party B’s activities are ruled customary in place and
the eﬀect is considered not-essential. Moreover, if the activities do violate
this standard of conduct, then party A is granted compensation beyond the
13For an early treatment of tort law, e.g., see Adams (1985). For the leading text book
on the economic analysis of the German Civil Code, see Schäfer and Ott (2000).
14For a further analysis of § 906 BGB, the reader is referred to Schweizer (2003).
23reasonable level only, well in line with general fault rules as investigated by
the present paper.15
The obligations model is used to examine a few basic provisions of German
obligations law. Obviously, it is contract law where diﬀerences between the
two traditions are most pronounced. German contract law introduces a great
v a r i e t yo fr u l e s ,m o s to fw h i c hh a v ey e tt ob em a d et h es u b j e c to ff o r m a l
economic analysis. The paper emphasizes those cases of contract law where,
due to impossibility, the promisor fails to perform as speciﬁed in the contract.
In principle, the promisee would then be entitled to expectation damages.
But the solution still diﬀers from a regime of pure expectation damages
because the promisee is granted such remedy only if the promisor is found
responsible for the impossibility to perform.
Fault rules in general are shown to exhibit very nice properties as far as
economic eﬃciency is concerned. In principle, remedies for breach of contract
can also be captured as fault rules and, as a consequence, should also be ef-
ﬁcient. In fact, for the appropriately speciﬁed delivery choice, expectation
damages turn out to provide eﬃcient incentives to invest. Yet, if breach of
contract occurs after nature’s move, then the saddle point property would
only hold for a delivery choice that is state-contingent. While the saddle
point property may be violated under constant delivery choices, the eﬃcient
solution may still emerge as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for some
constant delivery choice. For the appropriate delivery choice to exist, how-
ever, the choice set should be continuous. In this sense, the ineﬃciency of
expectation damages rests on the binary character of choice as imposed by
the traditional analysis of contract law.
No doubt, confronting economic models with actual law is a useful ex-
ercise. While the present paper, hopefully, is considered by the reader to
belong to this category, the many rules of German contract law leave more
of such exercises for future research.
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